Are Estimates of Asymmetric First-Price Auction Models Credible? Semi & Nonparametric Scrutinizations

Structural first-price auction estimation methods, built upon Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE), have provided prolific empirical findings. However, due to the latent nature of underlying valuations, the assumption of BNE is not feasibly testable with field data, a fact that evokes harsh criticism on the literature. To respond to skepticism regarding credibility, we provide a focused answer by scrutinizing estimates derived from experimental asymmetric auction data in which researchers observe valuations. We test the statistical equivalence between the estimated and true value distributions. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test fails to reject the distributional equivalence, strongly supporting the credibility of structural asymmetric auction estimates

Do Crime-Prone Areas Attract Gambling Shops? A Case of London Boroughs

We investigate a causal effect of crime on the number of betting shops by using annual data from London boroughs (2007-2015). Using an instrumental variable strategy, we estimate a panel model accounting for omitted variables and borough-level heterogeneity. Our estimation results show that a 1% increase in crime rate causes a 1.2% increase in the number of betting shops (per capita). Put differently, a new betting shop opens in a borough for every 1.4% increase in the local crime rate, on average. The causal effect is robust across a variety of specifications, although the magnitude varies across models

Lost in Transaction: Individual-Level Welfare Loss in Quickly-Circulating Durable Goods Markets with Planned Temporary Ownership

A new style of durable goods consumption through a large scale online redistribution marketplace (e.g. eBay and Yahoo! Auction), characterized by a relatively small degree of usage and a short-term ownership, is becoming increasingly popular these days. Yet, the welfare structures of such emerging markets have not been investigated. By using a unique dataset of quickly-circulating multi-use train ticket resale markets, and by investigating perfectly-substitutable goods, this short article models, estimates, and analyzes individual-level welfare loss in such rapidly-growing market sectors. Our analysis shows that individual-level welfare losses caused by search and resale costs are non-negligibly large, ranging from 3% to 15% of the new good price. We also find that such individual-level welfare losses, which could be considered as hidden charges, are largely heterogeneous across buyers with differing degrees of intended use. These losses are described as disadvantageous to users who demand light degrees of usage

Search and resale frictions in a two-sided online platform: A case of multi-use assets

How large are two-sided transaction costs in online platform trades, and who are the major beneficiaries of friction cost reductions? Using a dataset of a multi-use train ticket resale market, we analyze the welfare structure with buyer-seller matching frictions on an online platform. Our model shows that competitive online resale market prices work as a conductor of transaction cost externalities, clarifying what types of buyers bear what friction costs. The estimation results show that individual-level welfare losses, which could be considered an online resale market dead-weight loss, are non-negligibly large and heterogeneous across buyers, ranging from 3% to 21% of the new good price. Welfare losses are particularly disadvantageous to users who demand small degrees of usage, as they are more likely to be excluded from trading opportunities. Our model also suggests that, when competitive resale markets experience friction cost reductions, welfare gains are larger among small degree users of resalable goods, providing an explanation for the recent expansion of high-turnover online trades

Are Estimates of Asymmetric First-Price Auction Models Credible? Semi & Nonparametric Scrutinizations

Structural first-price auction estimation methods, built upon Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE), have provided prolific empirical findings. However, due to the latent nature of underlying valuations, the assumption of BNE is not feasibly testable with field data, a fact that evokes harsh criticism on the literature. To respond to skepticism regarding credibility, we provide a focused answer by scrutinizing estimates derived from experimental asymmetric auction data in which researchers observe valuations. We test the statistical equivalence between the estimated and true value distributions. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test fails to reject the distributional equivalence, strongly supporting the credibility of structural asymmetric auction estimates

How accurately do structural asymmetric first-price auction estimates represent true valuations?

Structural asymmetric first-price auction estimation methods have provided numerous empirical studies. However, due to the latent nature of underlying valuations, the accuracy of estimates is not feasibly testable with field data, a fact that could inhibit empirical auction market designs and applications based on structural estimates. To assess their accuracy, we provide an analysis of estimates derived from experimental asymmetric auction data, in which researchers observe valuations. We test the null of statistical equivalence between the estimated and true value distributions against the alternative of non-equivalence. When advanced models are used, the Modified Kolmogorov-Smirnov test fails to reject the distributional equivalence, supporting structural asymmetric auction estimations for auction market studies. In addition, recovered efficiencies have plus-minus 2.5 percent precision, compared to the true efficiencies

Bond Losses and Systemic Risk

This paper documents the existence of primary dealers' losses in Treasury bond markets and investigates how these losses affect dealers' market value. Using a novel data set that tracks more than 2,350 primary-to-secondary transactions, we find that bond losses for primary dealers are prevalent and were severe during the financial crisis. Our results indicate that liquidity constraints are a major source of bond losses observed in primary-to-secondary trades. We also find that financial sector value is correlated with these losses. Using an alternating market experiment, we show that bond losses are higher under discriminatory auctions as compared to uniform auctions

Auction Mechanisms and Treasury Revenue: Evidence from the Chinese Experiment

This paper exploits a large-size auction experiment conducted by two Chinese Government Treasury security issuers-the Chinese Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank-to investigate whether Treasury securities should be sold through uniform or discriminatory auction mechanisms. Based on the outcomes of more than 300 Treasury securities issued through an alternating auction-rule market experiment, we find that yield rates of the two auction formats are not statistically different. Further, these estimates indicate that there is no significant economic difference in terms of revenue between the two auction mechanisms. This result is robust across different bond-yield rate measurements and participation behavior

Auction Mechanisms and Treasury Revenue:Evidence from the Chinese Experiment

This paper exploits a large-size auction experiment conducted by two Chinese Government Treasury security issuers -the Chinese Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank- to investigate whether Treasury securities should be sold through uniform or discriminatory auction mechanisms. Based on the outcomes of more than 300 Treasury securities issued through an alternating auction-rule market experiment, we find that auction outcome yield rates of the two auction formats are not statistically different, suggesting revenue equivalence. This equivalence is robust across different revenue measurements and participation behavior

Three Applications of Structural Estimations in Oligopolistic and Auction Markets

This dissertation investigates empirical perspectives on strategic interactions in oligopolistic and auction markets. To support my claims, I structurally estimate, test, and simulate economic hypotheses regarding post-merger market prices (Chapter 1) and the effects of regret-averse attitudes in auction markets (Chapter 2). I also propose a structural estimation method for experimental auction data (Chapter 3)